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1. Introduction  
 
Sociology has been curiously reluctant to delve into lying as a topic of study, given its 
prevalence in the social world. In this paper we seek to contribute to the sociology of 
lying by returning to one of the key figures in the discipline’s birth, Georg Simmel, for it 
is in his work that the earliest developed account of lying as a social phenomenon can 
be found. When examining Simmel’s analysis we begin with his broader approach to 
interaction, as an experience that is conditioned upon non-knowledge, and work 
towards the attribution to him of the discovery of an aesthetic of concealment. This, we 
argue, can be used as a founding block in the renewal of a sociology of lying. Simmel 
goes on to examine lying as a shifting social form that is bound up with various other 
social forms, and which is transformed by changes occurring in modernity. But, as we 
will demonstrate, his analysis of lying is far too sweeping when it comes to social 
change, and he becomes confused as he tries to develop his exploration of lying with 
respect to other social forms. Our focus is on how Simmel links lying with romantic 
relationships. Love, we will show, leads him to art, and these phenomena, in 
combination, lead him astray from his own compelling ontological analysis of 
concealment and self-revelation.  
 
Although lying is at the centre of various political, technological, and social concerns 
today, we develop our critique by turning instead to the past, in order to discover what 
we can learn from the early modern period (ca. 1500-1700), a time in which many of 
those things remain nascent or uncertain which Simmel later sees accomplished and 
fatalistically accelerating beyond our control. This helps us to see how it is that Simmel 
comes to hold the position on lying and love that he develops. In exploring how we can 
understand lying and truth through art and love, Simmel affords us the opportunity to 
look to artists whose work has been concerned with these issues in exploration of his 
claim. We do this primarily by seeing how that figure so emblematic of the early 
modern, Shakespeare (1564-1616), navigated the relationship between these 
phenomena, and draw him into dialogue with Simmel, for it is in their differences that 
we can piece together a powerful approach to lies which might be applied to current 
concerns and to a range of problems in sociology more broadly.  
 
We focus on the English sonnet as one art key form of the early modern and one of the 
main mediums through which Shakespeare explored questions of truth and lies, love 
and art. A sonnet is a poem of fourteen iambic pentameter lines, rhyming, with some 
exceptions, abab cdcd efef gg.  Shakespeare’s Sonnet 138 is especially useful to 
developing a critique of Simmel, because it is explicitly concerned with love and lying, 
and – by being situated within the entire sonnet sequence - with the question of what 
art forms such as love poems can and cannot express. By bringing Simmel into dialogue 
with Shakespeare’s sonnet we reach a conclusion about how to adjust Simmel’s 
approach to lying to better fit his stronger sociological points and let go of his more 
sweeping and misguided attempts to diagnose lying within social change.  
 
The paper is built through an interdisciplinary dialogue between sociological theory 
(predominantly a close reading of Simmel’s key works on lying, secrecy and secret 
societies) and literary-historical scholarship on the early modern period. We read the 
sonnet as a kind of social theory in itself, with its own view on lying and love, which 
places our paper in line with recent efforts in this journal towards creating a more 
mutualistic approach to sociological engagements with literature (Barnwell, 2015; 
Váňa, 2020). 
 
2. Sociology of Lying  
 
Compared to other similar social phenomena (such as secrecy, for instance), there is 
relatively little sociological work on lying (Balmer, 2018). Indeed, the overwhelming 
majority of studies in the humanities on lying has been conducted in philosophy where 
it appears predominantly as a problem for philosophers of morality and language. 
Although it has been a peripheral issue (compared with truth’s centrality), it has 
nonetheless been considered in the works of most major figures in the Western 
philosophical canon. 
 
In philosophy, lying is near-universally considered to be morally bad. St. Augustine 
(1887) found duplicity fundamentally sinful for it separated people from the God-given 
gift of truth. Kant (see Mahon, 2006) appears to have felt lying was so damaging to trust 
in social order that we should rather tell the truth and imperil ourselves and others 
than use lies. In contemporary accounts, philosophers continue to find ways in which 
liars can be indicted for their lack of moral fibre and tend towards understanding lying 
as something that is antithetical to social norms of truthfulness and clarity (see, for 
example, Carson, 2010, or Fallis, 2009). 
 
Sociologists by contrast have been less willing to see lies as purely bad, but there is not 
a lot of sociological work to go on. Here we review what there is and draw out some key 
themes. Barnes (1994) noted the lack of sociological interest in lying a couple of 
decades ago, and set himself the task of bringing together various scant snippets of 
socially-informed thinking on lies from psychology, anthropology, politics and other 
disciplines. His review of these materials contributed to the sociology of lying most 
especially in the cross-cultural, comparative dimension, where he shows that 
anthropology in particular has helped to evidence how what we deem to count as a lie 
varies from culture to culture, not only from one linguistic community to another, but 
also possibly across lines of inequality, suggesting lying my differ across lines of class, 
for instance. From this, we see that lying must be understood in a way which takes 
seriously the effects of social context and change. We argue that Simmel had already 
initiated this approach in his efforts to understand lies from his vantage point in 
modernity, as he sees lies as being entangled with the shift towards urban living in the 
metropolis, but we show that he gets carried away with his singular view of how 
modern culture shapes inner experience.  
 
The select few studies with more explicitly sociological thinking have also helped to 
show that lying appears to be a key part of social life, and some scholars have gone as 
far as to argue that lies are in fact essential to social experience in one respect or 
another. Meltzer (2003) argues that lying is a key phenomenon which distinguishes us 
from other animal species (which he claims cannot lie), seeing lies thus as a defining 
feature of humanity.  He mostly argues in line with philosophical reasoning that lying is 
generally bad, because:  
 
it would appear quite self-evident that discovered lies are likely to adversely 
affect trust and cooperation, especially when the lies relate to important matters. 
The resulting resentment, suspicion, disappointment, and sense of betrayal may 
subvert previously cohesive relationships, whether intimate or impersonal. 
(Meltzer, 2003: 72)  
 
That being said, he does identify a few contexts in which lying might help maintain a 
relationship, and some situations in which we might normatively require people to lie 
(e.g. in political scenarios where lies might be told by appeal to the greater good). Here 
we have a hint that lying might be productive of social connection not simply 
destructive of it.  
 
It is in Goffman’s work where we find further contribution to lying in this regard.  
However, he very rarely used the term ‘lying’ himself and worked instead on 
information control practices, sequences of action or whole styles of performance and 
social display. This led him more frequently to a consideration of phenomena like 
secrecy, con tricks, undercover work and so forth, rather than lying per se (though lies 
were no doubt in his mind as part and parcel of these practices). For example, in his 
analysis of the presentation of self, Goffman (1971) outlines how groups (what he calls 
‘teams’) control the definition of a situation partly through strategic containment of 
information that would otherwise discredit the definition. For instance, a market 
salesperson might use a shill in the crowd to try to stir up consumer interest but if the 
shill is outed as such, this destroys the impression being given off. Goffman saw 
deceptions, fibs, secrets, cons, half-truths and strategic containments everywhere he 
looked, but, given his sensitivity to the work people do in order to maintain social 
organisation, he was cautious not to take too hard a moral stance on these elements of 
interaction. Indeed, he saw the moral question as something which we attend to as part 
of interaction itself. In his work on what he termed ‘fabrications’ or ‘containments’ 
(Goffman, 1974), where one person is kept out of the shared definition of the situation, 
he explored how people in everyday scenarios draw on the moral order to explain and 
account for these discrepant understandings of what is going on. Goffman posits that we 
respond to things like lies according to the moral binary of whether they are benign or 
exploitive, i.e. with respect to their ends, and not by some essential quality of the 
phenomena themselves (as has been common in philosophical work on lying). Benign 
fabrications are those which achieve (at least ostensibly) prosocial ends like keeping a 
friend in the dark about a surprise birthday party that you are organising, whereas 
exploitive fabrications are those which achieve antisocial ends, like keeping a romantic 
partner in the dark about an affair. On this axis we can take Goffman to be making 
claims about lying, too (though indirectly) and anticipate that they might be socially 
productive in some fashion, or at least be taken to be so by social actors in given 
situations.  
 
The sociologist who has gone furthest in the ‘lying is essential’ direction is Sacks (1995), 
whose argument that ‘everybody has to lie’ adopts an ethnomethodological approach to 
understanding how certain social interactions demand certain kinds of response. The 
example he takes is of conversational pairs, where sequences of talk prescribe and 
proscribe certain follow-up statements, most readily seen in his example of the 
everyday greeting ‘How are you?’ This question is not really a question, of course, and in 
fact there are only a few appropriate answers, as could be seen by breaching this norm. 
Suppose you walk down the street and a weak acquaintance recognises you vaguely and 
says, “How are you?” whilst carrying on walking at a pace. You know very well not to 
stop them so as to be able to answer truthfully, no matter how awful or wonderful you 
might be feeling. Instead, the only appropriate answers are variations on the theme of 
“I’m fine.”  As such, sometimes one has to say something which is not true about one’s 
thoughts, beliefs or experiences because social organisation demands it.  
 
The most recent advance in thinking on lying is to be found in Shilling and Mellor’s 
(2015) theoretical work on deception. They show that deception, in one form or 
another, has been embedded into various sociological theories since the discipline’s 
inception, but as a secondary concern to some broader issue, as could be seen in the 
Marxist development of ‘false consciousness’, for instance. And they too seek to return 
to Simmel in order to develop their sociological thinking. Their analysis contributes an 
important dimension to social theorising of lies by showing that deception is negotiated 
within experiences of inequality, such that some groups might need to lie in order to 
survive in an unjust social order. Marginalised groups in the LGBTQ community 
represent an excellent case in point with respect to ‘the closet’ and navigating their 
identities in different situations, learning to ‘pass’ in order to access resources 
otherwise unavailable to them.  
 
In these pockets of literature, then, we have an outline of two key points regarding how 
sociologists might think about lying. First, lying must be viewed with respect to social 
change. Second, lying should not be assumed to be simply destructive of social order 
and might indeed support social organisation in at least some instances. For our 
interests we try to develop on both of these points by returning to Georg Simmel’s 
thinking on lying and show that these issues are expressed in his work and that we can 
build from them.  
 
3. Simmel’s Sociology of Lying  
 
Simmel’s (1858-1918) sociological and philosophical investigations were conducted in 
Berlin, at the turn of the 20th century, positioning him perfectly as an observer of 
metropolitan life in one of Europe’s most enigmatic urban centres. His work is very 
much indebted to and reflects upon the shifting relations he observed in Germany’s 
capital as transport, industry, government, fashion, consumerism and any number of 
other social forms were pulled into the turbulent storm of modernity.  
 
Simmel’s analyses of modernity and its effects are infused with the socio-psychological 
dimensions of life, both in relation to the group and the individual. For example, he 
explores how art forms (objective culture) and individual creativity (subjective culture)  
develop as modernity proceeds, and characteristically discerns doom in modernity’s 
transformations, seeing the objective coming to dominate the subjective, leaving us 
surrounded by forms through which we might develop ourselves, but anaesthetised by 
their over-abundance (Simmel, 1968).  
 
Having written about a quite astonishing number of topics, the classic interpretation of 
his work as a whole was thus, for some time, that he failed to build a systematic 
approach to social investigation. One might read him as having struggled to do so due to 
the very effects of modernity which he diagnosed, imbuing his writing with 
fragmentation and over-abundance, leaving readers unable to respond to his 
effervescence (Frisby, 2013). It is true that Simmel wrote in an eclectic fashion, and that 
this led to his reception for a number of decades as an obtuse, flaneur type figure 
(Weinstein and Weinstein, 1991). But in recent decades his style of expression and 
thinking has been celebrated. Habermas, for example, describes Simmel’s approach as 
having risen to the challenge of the times rather than as having become a victim of 
them: 
 
More than anything else, what distanced him from the academic world was 
Simmel's mentality, which was characterized by a sensitive awareness of the 
attractions typical of his times; of aesthetic innovations; of spiritual shifts of 
disposition and changes of orientation in the metropolitan attitudes to life; and 
of subpolitical transformations of inclination and barely tangible, diffuse, but 
treacherous phenomena of the everyday. (Habermas, 1996: 405) 
 
And writing against his reception as a flaneur, Deena and Michael Weinstein have 
sought to reconceive Simmel as having pre-empted postmodernity, rendering him more 
a bricoleur, “on a mission of cultural mapping, tracing the affinities and ruptures among 
the cultural complexes of the modern/postmodern metropolis … a poststructuralist 
before the advent of structuralism.” (Weinstein and Weinstein, 2013: 65). Indeed, for 
our present concerns, it is Simmel’s attention to the barely tangible, the affective 
affinities and disruptions of metropolitan experience that leads him to the consideration 
of everyday subjective phenomena like lying. And it is his insistence on rendering these 
microsocial features of experience against the expansive background of changes in 
objective culture which makes his thinking on lying so promising for sociological 
theorising.  
 
However, despite this recovery of value in Simmel’s ‘sensitive’, ‘tracing’ approach, there 
remains a tension in his works between his epistemological and metaphysical efforts, as 
even whilst he seeks to understand the specific, fragmentary and unique, he is also 
striving towards totality and unity in an overall view (Featherstone, 1991). So, whilst 
we can acknowledge the power of Simmel’s eclectic approach as a critic of modernity, 
and even see him as a prescient observer of postmodern themes, we must also retain an 
awareness of his own struggle to make the singular speak to the general, the individual 
to the law, and thus attend to possible tensions that arise from his efforts to look in both 
directions at once.  
 
These thematic, methodological, intellectual and aesthetic elements and struggles in 
Simmel’s writing find expression in his thinking about lying. In exploring his approach 
to lies we engage in a close reading of his essays on secrecy, secret societies and on how 
society is possible. We focus our attention on those sections of his work explicitly 
concerned with lying, but we also adopt his more general comments on talk, and his 
broader investigations of concealment and secrecy, to frame and adjust his position on 
lies. Most importantly, we argue that Simmel’s relational approach to society and its 
connection to inner life can be more forcefully applied to his account of lying than he 
managed to achieve.  
 
One thing on which Simmel (1910) is quite clear is that we can never tell or know the 
whole or objective truth about someone else’s inner world, nor even perhaps about our 
own. This is, in part, because he understands psychological processes to be chaotic, 
comprised of “flaring up” conceptions, “zigzag motions”, the “whirling of images”, and 
sequential ideas which are “entirely unrelated to one another” (Simmel, 1950: 311), 
meaning that we are not at all perfect witnesses to, nor commentators on, our own 
inner world. Contrary to the common philosophical assertion (in research on lying) that 
truthful expression of our inner experience is the default conversational norm, Simmel 
argues that to disclose the chaotic, absurd truth of our inner life would in fact 
contravene the norms of sociation and the rules of conversation, making us seem mad. 
This is an important departure for sociological studies and moves us away from 
philosophical reasoning immediately. 
 
Adding to such intersubjective opacity, Simmel argues, is the way in which our 
relationships are always conducted on the basis of specificity and generalisation, 
meaning that we have a personal picture of the people we encounter, depicting them as 
both unique individuals on the basis of their specific actions and expressions in our 
direct encounters with them, whilst we also characterise them as general types. To put 
this into the language of painting, our portraits of each other are more in the tradition of 
Francis Bacon than they are of Rembrandt. It is this figurative style of social portraiture 
of the other which unavoidably informs our own selectivity and expression, painting 
ourselves for the other in a similarly stylised fashion:   
 
Whatever we say, as long as it goes beyond mere interjection and minimal 
communication, is never an immediate and faithful presentation of what really 
occurs in us during that particular time of communication, but is a 
transformation of this inner reality, teleologically directed, reduced, and 
recomposed. With an instinct automatically preventing us from doing otherwise, 
we show nobody the course of our psychic processes in their purely causal 
reality and from the standpoints of logic, objectivity, and meaningfulness 
complete incoherence and irrationality. Always, we show only a section of them, 
stylized by selection and arrangement. We simply cannot imagine any 
interaction or social relation or society which are not based on this teleologically 
determined nonknowledge of one another. (Simmel, 1950: 312) 
 
From this view, the necessary condition of our social experience is not transparency, or 
complete truth, but selectivity, filtering and non-disclosure. Lies are therefore 
extensions of a deeper and even more routine formation of talk and revelation, a styling 
and arrangement which operates through habitual concealment. Simmel does not quite 
go so far as to say explicitly that this stylisation, selection and arrangement constitute 
an aesthetic, but with due consideration to his insights into the aesthetics of modernity 
elsewhere (Frisby, 2013) it is fair, we think, to thus attribute to him the idea of an 
aesthetic of concealment which informs all interaction. Treating this aesthetic as 
ontologically prior to any given sequence of talk or self-presentation proves to be the 
key to our reinforcement of Simmel’s broader position in the context of lying.  
 
Indicative of his understanding that lies are not merely bad, or a separating force, 
Simmel notes that they might be absolutely crucial to the maintenance of at least some 
relations:  
 
The lie is merely a very crude and, ultimately, often a contradictory form in 
which this necessity [of selectivity] shows itself. However often a lie may destroy 
a given relationship, as long as the relationship existed, the lie was an integral 
element of it. (Simmel, 1950: 316-317)  
 
Curiously, having thus moved in quite a contrary direction to the canonical take on lying 
as bad and disconnecting, Simmel then seems to fall back in line with that more 
traditional account of what a lie is, arguing that it involves the liar “hiding his true idea 
from the other” (Simmel, 1950: 312). This is the kind of claim that we see quite clearly 
in philosophical accounts and not at all what we might expect of Simmel given his 
broader aesthetic argument. Before we move to adjust his position, though, we can try 
to read these claims as a consistent account. To do so, we would suggest that Simmel 
thinks we are able to know at least some discrete, clear truths about our inner worlds 
and to say them to others as simple, transparent statements. Perhaps we could say that 
we know these by selectively choosing, from amongst the chaos, uncertainty, confusion 
and contradiction, those things which can be given more logical or rational expression, 
but in the case of a lie choose not to express. This would still be a secondary action, 
though, based upon the aesthetic of concealment he identifies, and so it is hard to see 
how this resolves into the definitional statement of lying being the “hiding [of] his true 
idea from the other” when the ontologically prior action of stylisation and filtering 
requires this hiding of our inner experience as a habitual and necessary process. This 
generous reading falls short of his more sophisticated description of the relational and 
messy nature of inner life. In addition, as we now show, it becomes clearer that he is in 
something of a bind when he brings his discussion of lying into dialogue with changes in 
other social forms.   
 
Simmel muses on lying’s bearing on several different forms of sociation, including 
business relations and friendships, but here we focus on romantic ties. He describes 
intimacy as a kind of play of proximity, requiring both “physical and psychological 
nearness” but also “distances and intermissions”, for although “reciprocal knowledge 
conditions relationships positively … they also presuppose a certain ignorance and a 
measure of mutual concealment” (Simmel, 1950: 316-317). He seems interested in the 
way in which different relational forms allow different degrees of self-revelation, and in 
a consideration of the difference between friendship and love, arrives at the conclusion 
that “for most people, sexual love opens the doors of the total personality more widely 
than does anything else. For not a few, in fact, love is the only form in which they can 
give their ego in its totality, just as to the artist the form of his art offers the only 
possibility for revealing his whole inner life.” (Simmel, 1950: 325). He goes on to argue 
that in the early stages of a romance, the partners desire to let themselves be 
“completely absorbed by the other” (Simmel, 1950: 328), but that this risks them having 
nothing left to share, “sobering” them up, and thereby depleting the passionate pursuit 
of the truths of each other’s inner life: “it paralyzes the vitality of relations and lets their 
continuation really appear pointless.” (Simmel, 1950: 329) But, he argues, whilst most 
of us are likely to fall victim to this paradox of social inebriation, some few have a kind 
of magical wellspring of self-creation, which allows them never to be fully quenched by 
the other’s appetites:  
 
Only those individuals can give themselves wholly without danger who cannot 
wholly give themselves, because their wealth consists in a continuous 
development in which every abandon is at once followed by new treasures. Such 
individuals have an inexhaustible reservoir of latent psychological possessions, 
and hence can no more reveal and give them away at one stroke than a tree can 
give away next year’s fruits with those of the season. (Simmel, 1950: 329)  
 
Here, Simmel adopts a spatial metaphor (the reservoir), which seems to imply that self-
revelation has a manifest form (as a kind of liquid that could be stored, conveyed and 
consumed). Earlier, he uses the metaphor of absorption, as though someone’s 
revelations could be soaked up, and “sobriety”, implying a kind of intoxication that 
might result from this consumption. These liquid metaphors make sense if we think 
Simmel is trying to understand truth and lies within the logic of a kind of 
conversational, desiring consumption of the other. As beautiful as the paradox of an 
inexhaustible consumption might be, it isn’t at all clear why some special few should be 
so brimming over with self-creation while others starve for want of more self. If the 
aesthetic of concealment is truly an ontological condition of self-expression then we 
should all be able to craft more self-talk from that ceaselessly churning inner world.  
 
This leaves Simmel in some degree of contradiction with regard to his more founding 
ontological position on revelation of inner experience, and his descriptions of 
concealment and love. Tantalisingly, in suggesting that love and art might be forms 
through which total revelation of oneself can occur, he opens the door to a critique of 
his position through art forms, for in these we often find rich and evocative explorations 
of love, of the dances of deception between partners, and of the powers and constraints 
of art as a means of expressing oneself. We thus see this as a key juncture in Simmel’s 
thinking that will allow us to revise his analysis if we look at an alternative way of 
understanding the connections between truth and self-expression; lying and 
concealment; love and art. We develop this response in the following section. But first, 
we continue with Simmel to explore what he has to say about lying with regard to social 
change.  
 
Simmel’s thinking on modernity in general often confronts the psychological 
consequences of changes in external life. As Frisby (1992: 60) puts it, all “the central 
features of modernity which Simmel analyses in the ‘outer world’, as it were, are 
expressed and manifest themselves in the ‘inner’ life of individuals.” Simmel argues that 
we retreat from the chaos of modernity further into ourselves, to protect ourselves from 
the maddening spin of change and impermanence, bringing about his well-known 
claims regarding neurasthenia and the blasé attitude.  
 
In writing about lying, Simmel (1950: 312-315) is also concerned with social change. He 
draws a comparison between what he terms “pre-modern societies” and “modern 
societies”. What he has in mind for the former are small village communities, with little 
diversification of labour, predominantly organised around communal living spaces in 
which people have lived for most of human history; for the latter he has in mind the 
urban metropolis as a mode of life in the 1800s, in which there is a rapid transformation 
in the diversity in forms of labour, where the capitalist mode of production and the 
money economy result in lives which are - to his mind - increasingly differentiated and 
isolated.  
 
These shifts in widespread new forms of living, argues Simmel, bring about a transition 
in lying. He claims that in the pre-modern era, groups of people live too intimately and 
are too alike to be able to conceal much from each other or to lie to each other. The 
(revelation of) lies that are told, he says, must have very little impact on social cohesion 
because people’s lives are too deeply entangled for deceptions to disrupt their bonds 
substantially. In the modern age, by contrast, he feels that lying has become more 
commonplace, even amongst people in the same family, for living arrangements 
produce greater privacy and diversification produces less shared understanding and 
personal similarity. As a result, he finds that lies become easier and more dangerous for 
social cohesion as society moves into the modern era, for they intensify diversification 
and individualization and break the already stretched bonds of trust between weakly 
tied individuals.  
 
On an immediate reading these claims look overly sweeping and he does not do nearly 
well enough to bring together his analysis of talk as always selective, filtered and 
arranged, what we termed his aesthetic of concealment, with his thinking on lying in 
modernity. Instead, it seems to be his thinking on modern aesthetics, as an over-
abundance of shifting representations resulting in hyperstimulation, which dominates 
his approach to lying within social transformation. People can lie more easily and are 
perhaps impelled to lie more by these effects of modern living, pushing us ever more 
inwards as modernity encroaches further upon the psychological terrain. Here Simmel 
leaves little room for subtlety or the possibly balancing effects of other shifting social 
forms.  
 
Whilst recent efforts to rehabilitate Simmel’s work more broadly have tended to project 
his analyses forward in time, seeing him as a precursor or even as a prophet of 
postmodernity, we instead look to Simmel’s own precursors, to the early modern 
period, in which many of the social forms which Simmel is concerned with in modernity 
are beginning to develop. Shakespeare, as a similarly prominent figure writing about 
the twists and turns of everyday experience, also setting them against the background 
of social changes, makes for a promising interlocuter. In particular, his sonnet sequence 
is directly concerned with the questions of artistic expression, and these become 
entangled with his exploration of lying’s connection to love in Sonnet 138. He is also a 
figure who is very much best understood within the shifting terrain of social change. In 
what follows, we explain Shakespeare’s context, provide a close reading of Sonnet 138, 
and situate the sonnet form within the period. This helps us to see that Simmel’s 
thinking on art and self-expression is incongruent with the artistic practices which 
preceded him. And this helps us to understand how the very questions Simmel sees as 
arising with modernity’s social transformations are already under critical reflection, are 
subject to ironic and playful treatment, by the time Shakespeare’s sonnets are 
published. As such, we can also reject some of Simmel’s overly sweeping claims about 
how lies shift with social change, and find greater support for his more powerful 
discovery, the aesthetic of concealment. 
 
4.  Sonnet 138 “I lie with her, and she with me” 
 
Simmel looks to art for an understanding of how we might totally express ourselves, 
seeing art as a parallel to love in this regard. Of course, art forms of various sorts have 
been deeply interested in love’s powers. And indeed, love is a central theme in early 
modern literatures, finding expression in devotional treatises, ballads, and in lyric 
poetry, especially the sonnet, which held a central role in the period’s amorous 
articulations. Imported into England by sixteenth century courtier poets from medieval 
Italian and French models, English sonnets drew in particular from Francesco 
Petrarcha’s (or “Petrarch’s”) well-known and widely translated collection, or 
“sequence”, Il Canzoniere (c. 1327). So the English sonnet form was, by the 1580s at 
least, a “fashionable” (North, 2010 [2007]: 204) poetic modality. In particular it has 
become known for strikingly “introspective” (Felch, 2020: 40) contemplations on the 
“paradoxical nature” (Bates, 2011: 109) of romantic desire, “and its interactions with 
the self and the wider social world” (Waller, 2011: 136). 
 
Today, we are perhaps more familiar with the Petrarchan conventions of the 
Elizabethan love sonnet than any other lyric form from the early modern period. The 
heteronormative binary image of the lovesick speaker-poet and the unattainable 
beloved, have served as an enduring cultural touchstone for a now lost world of courtly 
love and erotic intrigue, shaping our contemporary understandings of early modern 
romantic experiences. However, while love is deeply embedded in the Western sonnet 
tradition, our “predisposition to admire [early modern] sonnets as love poems par 
excellence” (Moss, 2017: 253) has worked to supress the playful opacities of the form as 
practiced by some early modern sonneteers, and as understood by first readers.  
 
Shakespeare’s engagements with the sonnet form are particularly striking in this 
regard. His sequence of 154  sonnets, which was published by Thomas Thorpe under 
the pithy title, Shakes-peares Sonnets, in 1609, “marks a boldly decisive abandonment” 
(Duncan-Jones, 2003: 141) of the courtly love traditions of mistress worship and 
unfulfilled desire, traditions that had become, by the last decade of the reign of 
Elizabeth I (1558-1603), predictable and cliché. Although specific lines from individual 
Shakespearean sonnets (such as “Shall I compare thee to a Summers day?” from Sonnet 
18, or “Let me not to the marriage of true mindes” from Sonnet 116) have since 
“acquired a romantic reputation” (Edmondon and Wells, 2020: 16), continuing to script 
our devotional encounters today (for instance, through wedding readings), Shakes-
peares Sonnets treats heterosexual love as something contemptuous and parochial. The 
sequence’s female love-object – the so-called “Dark Lady” – is infamously treated as an 
object of misogynistic scorn and “sexual disgust” (Schwarz, 2008: 742), rather than as 
an object of romantic idealisation. Conversely, Shakes-peares Sonnets fetishizes a 
beautiful male youth, who is consistently addressed with longing and reverence, a 
figure who “becomes the object of […] idolatrous admiration”, while “the woman 
becomes his dangerous adversary” (Callaghan, 2007: 59). As a consequence, this sonnet 
sequence is remarkable in its portrayal of heterosexual love as an unsatisfactory, messy 
exploit, founded on complex relational patterns of manipulation, deceit, and self-
deception.  
 
Sonnet 138 (in full below, or see Duncan-Jones, 2010) is an excellent exemplification of 
these complex themes:       
      
When my love swears that she is made of truth,  
I do believe her, though I know she lies, 
That she might think me some untutored youth  
Unlearned in the world’s false subtleties. 
Thus vainly thinking that she thinks me young,    
Although she knows my days are past the best, 
Simply I credit her false-speaking tongue;     
On both sides thus is simple truth suppressed.  
But wherefore says she not she is unjust? 
And wherefore say not I that I am old?     
O, love’s best habit is in seeming trust, 
And age in love loves not t’have years told:     
 Therefore I lie with her, and she with me, 
 And in our faults by lies we flattered be.   
 
Here, the sonnet-speaker (the persona that Shakespeare adopts) and the “Dark Lady” 
tell each other lies. She “swears” that she is “made of truth” (that is, virtuous, and, 
punning on “maid” to mean virginal), despite the implied suggestion that she is sexually 
active, or “unjust”; while the poet-speaker performs the role of a sexually naïve “youth” 
to mask the fact that his “days are past the best”. In the second line, the sonnet-speaker 
confesses that he paradoxically permits himself to “believe” the “lies” she tells, and she, 
in turn, is understood to be doing the same, and may at least humour the poet-speaker’s 
own vanity. With this comes a shared, participatory investment in the illusionary power 
of concealments and untruths: the projection of an outward show is love’s “best habit”, 
performed on “both sides” of the relationship. The word “habit” is used in a double 
sense, evoking, on the one hand, a sartorial metaphor for clothing, attire, and outward 
dress, and, on the other, the more conventional sense of “habit” as custom and 
compulsion. The implication is that everyday untruths and the strategic manipulation of 
appearances are love’s defining feature rather than its rival, animating and perpetuating 
an erotic charge that bonds, with the “lie” serving as a generative and productive force, 
uniting the sonnet’s “I” and “her”, the “she” and the “me”. This sonnet is, in other words, 
analysing deception as mutual and participatory, putting forth a scenario in which lying 
might reinforce, rather than undermine, a shared confidence in love’s “credit”. If Sonnet 
138 can therefore be said to represent love, it is a particular brand of love that thrives 
on lies, and that makes more murky easy distinctions between the close and the 
separate, between concealing and revealing, knowing and not knowing. The sonnet’s 
analysis of lying and love is powerfully evocative of Simmel’s ontological position and 
his aesthetic of concealment. And, being art itself, the sonnet’s analysis evidences a 
playfulness with the question of what can be expressed about love, what truths can be 
told about oneself. It’s contradictions and paradoxes, puns and linguistic tricks remind 
us that the sonnet too cannot be simply trusted as an authentic, transparent reflection 
of the author’s or speaker’s self.  
 
5. Seeing “on both sides” – Art, Lying and Self-Expression 
 
Simmel’s claim that love and “art offers the only possibility for revealing” one’s “whole 
inner life” would therefore not have been straightforwardly recognised by Shakespeare 
and his contemporaries. In a number of important ways, writers such as Shakespeare 
were not trained to create art as a means of pure self-expression about oneself, one’s 
loves, desires, passions and so on, as Simmel would come to believe of such artworks.  
To quote Smith, (2019) “no literature of this period has the revelation of the artist’s own 
inner feelings at its legible core”; instead, “the primary impulse … behind early modern 
writing … is rhetorical rather than autobiographical” (313).  Early modern scholars tend 
to read early modern forms of creative writing not within the frame of revealing the 
“inner life” of the author but rather in dialogue with early modern Protestant-Humanist 
pedagogical programmes. These programmes were the soil in which were grown a 
number of highly influential Elizabethan male poets and dramatists, including 
Christopher Marlowe (1564-1593), Ben Jonson (1572-1637), and Shakespeare himself. 
These writers were likely to have been instructed in the liberal arts of poetry, history, 
moral philosophy, Latin grammar and rhetoric, skills that were designed to prepare 
them for “active citizenship” (Peltonen, 2009: 239), but that also instilled a “rhetorical 
view of life” that conceived of “man as fundamentally a role player” (Lanham, 1976: 4).  
Forms of Latinate rhetorical training in Elizabethan grammar schools included diction 
and ornamentation, essay writing, speech making, reverse translation, and 
commonplacing, a practice that involved gathering together of sententiae from classical 
sources into miscellanies or commonplace books, which could then be redeployed in the 
compiler’s own writings and day-to-day speech. Rhetorical handbooks, which by the 
end of the sixteenth century were circulating widely in print, placed special emphasis 
on the interlinked exercise of imitatio (or mimesis), in which schoolboys were 
encouraged to assimilate the writings of authoritative figures into their own writings, 
and to therefore “mimic … a host of passions that were not their own” (Enterline, 2012: 
8).  
 
While Simmel understood creative “art” as a potential vehicle for the sincere expression 
of one’s “whole inner life”, early moderns already understood artistic making in terms 
that sit more comfortably with Simmel’s commentary on the aesthetics of concealment. 
“A poet is … a Maker, or a fainer: His Art, an Art of imitation, or faining”, writes Ben 
Jonson (1641: 125), cutting to the heart of early modern poetry’s obsession with 
artifice, and to that culture’s reflexivity about lyric poetry, especially love poetry, as a 
“faining” (that is, an imaginative and deceptive) performance.  
 
The “measure of success” for poets like Shakespeare “is not whether someone is in love 
but whether he can persuade the reader that he is” (Alexander, 2010: 202). In this 
context, we might follow Guy-Bray (2021: 127) and read Sonnet 138 as a form of 
“metarepresentation”. It is an artful simulation of a love affair, packaged up in a 
metrically- and rhythmically-compressed little capsule, and it is at the same time about 
the central role of artful simulation in love. The “she” and the “I” of this sonnet engage in 
forms of mutual rhetorical manipulation, constructing self-flattering images of 
themselves for consumption by the other. This suspension of the “truth” through the 
imitation and embodiment of idealised personas – “made of truth”, “untutored youth” – 
is not, however, understood to be the death knell of their love affair, since “their playful 
falsehoods [secure] their affection” (Shapiro, 2005: 199). As such, Simmel’s positive 
affirmation of the connecting power of some lies and concealments finds earlier 
affirmation in Shakespeare’s sonnet. Indeed, by finally turning on the ambiguities of the 
word “lie” in the final couplet - a word that signifies both an untruth and that serves as a 
metaphor for sex - Sonnet 138 rounds off by promoting fabrication (or “faining”) as that 
which makes love, and love-making, possible.  
 
We can move these ideas forward by turning to another prominent rhetorical technique 
that was codified in the early modern grammar school: argumentum in utramque 
partem, in which schoolboys were taught to persuasively argue on both sides of a 
question regardless of “personal feelings” (Smith, 2019: 313). This practice “permeated 
virtually all areas of intellectual life” (Altman, 1978: 43) in the Tudor and Elizabethan 
periods, and it “left its particular mark on much of the literature” of those periods, too. 
While modalities of imitatio and commonplacing emphasised performative mimicry and 
the cross-hatching of voices as a central component of literary composition, 
argumentum in utramque partem structured habits of thought that accommodated 
alterity: “the ability”, to quote Pitts Donahoe (2018), “to put oneself in the position of 
another and look around at the world from his or her point of view” (319). It’s another 
reminder that “neither Shakespeare nor any of his contemporary dramatists wrote 
autobiographically” (Maguire and Smith, 2013: 71). Rather, like the “she” and “me” of 
Sonnet 138, who are bound together by a shared ability to hold contrary positions in 
mind – to “believe” the “lies” of the other, and to see “[o]n both sides” – they were being 
trained to speak at odds, and to think bi-focally in terms of what might constitute 
“simple truth”. 
 
We argue, then, that the difficulty we have in resolving Simmel’s comments on the 
aesthetics of talk and the powers of love are born out of the acceptance of a totalising 
impression of art’s function, which is not well-aligned with his own ontological view of 
social life more broadly. The post-Romantic ideal of art – that it allows a perfect, sincere, 
and total self-expression – is seen to reflect the ideal of romance itself, that love too 
allows such unbridled transparency. Simmel is enamoured by this possibility when he 
writes about truth and lies. He makes this case metaphorically, through a language of 
passionate inebriation and intoxication. But the literary artists working on sonnets in 
the early modern period, whose work went on to shape such images of love as wild self-
revelation, often did not see love or art in this way. Understanding Shakespeare’s 
critical interpretation of lying and love helps us to place our struggle with Simmel in 
context: it is his ideas about love and art that go awry, not his ideas about lying. That 
intoxication of love, the sense of giving oneself entirely, is a product of cultural history, 
and this seems to be very much attached to Simmel’s understanding of art as a 
potentially unmediated expression of inner experience. As such, we resolve to treat his 
arguments about lying through his aesthetic of concealment, rather than his aesthetic of 
love: to see lies in Bacon’s style, rather than Rembrandt’s.  
 
6. Conclusion – Lying with each other  
 
In Sonnet 138 we see how lying can be connecting even as it produces distance; how lies 
in the context of love seem sometimes to amplify attraction even as they conceal and 
obscure. This lyrical social analysis was set against a background of education in which 
artists like Shakespeare were being trained in modes of writing and self-composition 
that not only accepted the multiplicity of voice and self, and thus reflected on the power 
and limits of art as self-expression, but actively encouraged play with those concerns in 
the very forms they were training to write. This is beautifully exemplified in Sonnet 
138’s analysis. Simmel’s sweeping claim that social transformations associated with 
modernity lead to more lies, which become more pernicious as inwardness intensifies, 
seems near-parochial by comparison with the complexity of Sonnet 138’s playful 
approach to lying and truth.  
 
There is much to be admired in Simmel’s account, but his inclination towards sweeping 
descriptions of uniform social change does disservice to the complexity of social 
transitions with regard to inner experience and communication, which shape the 
transformation of lying as a social form as we move towards modernity. The early 
modern sonnet, and the content of individual sonnets, show that questions regarding 
the tension of concealment and self-revelation were already well developed by the 
1600s. The early modern offers a period for study in which these questions are very 
much alive and lived, as we see in the way that Shakespeare’s training in forms of 
writing leads to a deeply uncertain, playful and paradoxical account of what it means to 
be truthful or dishonest in love (and, thereby, in art). In this way, Simmel’s attendance 
to change in lying is painted with too broad a brush. In one strand of thinking, he is 
concerned to show that revelation and concealment are inherent to all interaction, but 
that they are not immune to transformation, and by doing so provides much for our 
understanding of these phenomena, setting an important founding stone for sociological 
theorising about lying. Lying has to be understood against the background of shifting 
social forms. But we cannot focus on only those which seem to push us apart and lead us 
into psychological retreat. Lying, that seemingly most disconnecting of forces, in the 
context of sonnets, those seemingly most expressive works of art, comes into dialogue 
with love, that seemingly most connecting power. There are thus tensions, 
contradictions and alignments as these phenomena mix, and we can now see inner 
experience and our expression of that inner life as a melting pot of uncertainty, 
bubbling over with expression and concealment, feigning and flattering, truths all 
mixed-up in denials, people brought together in true passion through self-deception and 
playful artifice. The sonnet already evidences the aesthetic of concealment in action, 
which Simmel later identifies sociologically, and which permeates all interaction, but in 
fleshing it out he falls into conceptual contradictions which need critical appraisal. This 
happens most especially as he tries to navigate his ontological, aesthetic position on talk 
with his own culturally-embedded ideas about love and art.  
 
We can take Simmel’s fundamental insight, that lying shifts with respect to other social 
forms, but not his elaboration of how it shifts and thus we must also sacrifice his 
predictions for the future. These put aside, we have a clear picture of what Simmel can 
now contribute to renewing the sociology of lying. An understanding of lying as a social 
form which shifts over time in relational dynamics amongst the vast web of other 
mundane practices, and which is an extension of an underlying, ontologically prior and 
pervasive not-knowing that results from necessary forms of non-disclosure. This we 
term the aesthetic of concealment that conditions both our experiences of truth and 
untruth. From Shakespeare and from our reading of scholarship on the early modern 
we take the lesson that as these shifts in forms occur they are knowingly played with, 
and in that play, perhaps, they are adjusted, mediated and coped with. Simmel sees only 
retreat, but Shakespeare evidences the complex interplay of the private and public in 
that very discussion of shifting experiences of lying and disclosure. This makes for a 
better relational picture of lying than Simmel was able to achieve from his vantage point 
alone.  
 
This relational approach also helps us to ask questions of lying that can be explored 
sociologically in any period. We have shown the value of the early modern as a 
sociological resource, offering a fascinating time period in which to examine sociology’s 
founding conceptions, perhaps most importantly with regard to social change. The early 
modern provides sociologists with a way to trace and retrace some of what the 
modernist social theorists had come to take for granted, and thereby to problematise 
certain dimensions of their thinking.   
 
But, questions of lying are perhaps most especially due in our contemporary era. For 
lying is currently problematised in various discourses concerned with misinformation, 
“post-truth”, Brexit, racism and far-right movements, social media and political spin. 
The list of practices entangled with untruth is increasingly extensive and has led to 
hyperbolic claims that truth is no longer the foundation of our society. But what we see 
in our adventure with Shakespeare and Simmel is that “the simple truth” never was our 
“best habit”. Instead, truth emerges from an aesthetic of concealment.  
 
We can thus ask how does lying occur with respect to diverse social forms, and to 
changes in those forms, and with what ramifications for how truth is negotiated? And do 
so without seeing lying as an amoral offshoot of truth-telling; rather we see both as 
conditioned by the same aesthetic process. To answer that question, we must therefore 
attend to the contradictory and uncertain ways in which lying is transformed rather 
than being carried away by fears that lying and inwardness are only intensified and 
expanded as social change wears on. An extensive empirical exploration of lying within 
various social practices is required. 
 
In addition, and contrary to the long-held account in philosophy of lying, which tends 
towards a rejection of lies on moral grounds for the damage they do to society and to 
relationships, we should ask how lying within particular relations and practices is 
involved in producing both connection and disconnection. Rather than assuming its role 
as a fragmenting and dislocating force, how might it both intensify self-disclosure and 
bonding even as it obfuscates knowledge of self and other?  
 
We can also reject any underlying or explicit appeal to changing our social forms today 
in view to producing a society founded solely on truth and transparency. The discovery 
of the aesthetic of concealment cautions us against any such appeal and requires instead 
that we explore how it is that we navigate, individually, as groups and in culture writ-
large, the always uncertain, always partial knowledge we have of ourselves and others. 
Any future in which we might overcome today’s challenges of truth and its others will 
not be won through a simplistic appeal to founding society on transparency. To return 
to Sonnet 138, let us begin to ask how lying is entangled with the social order and not 
see it only an interruption, let us look at how lying and truth are both fundamentally 
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